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1.  Introduction. 
Economists from the United States, Austria, France, Germany and Switzerland were once 
surveyed regarding their opinions on nearly 30 different questions of economic practice.
1  They 
were asked if they generally agreed with, agreed with, or generally disagreed with statements 
such as “the money supply is a more important target than interest rates for monetary policy” or 
“consumer protection laws generally reduce economic efficiency.”  Among the American 
economists surveyed, more than 97 percent of the respondents either agreed or generally agreed 
with the statement “tariffs and import quotas reduce general economic welfare.”  This degree of 
consensus was only surpassed by agreement or general agreement by more than 98 percent of 
those surveyed with the assertion that “a ceiling on rents reduces the quantity and quality of 
housing available.”  This should come as a surprise to no one who has been trained as a 
neoclassical economist.
2  This view among practitioners stands in stark contrast to the view from 
the street where “globalization” is not always embraced.  Indeed, if one subscribes to the view 
that the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund seek to 
promote globalization, then protests within the past year of meetings in Seattle and Washington 
D.C. indicate that a significant share of the public is frankly hostile to increased globalization.   
While those who oppose globalization do not form a monolithic bloc, at least some of the 
protesters worry that greater trade and investment flows between the United States and low-
income countries will lead to an erosion of American wages and perhaps even job loss.  Indeed, 
having observed an increase in the differential between high-skill and low-skill workers in the 
United States concurrent with an explosion of trade between the U.S. and low-income countries, 
many in the economics profession have echoed some of these public concerns and have turned a 
spotlight on the potential link between trade and wages.  In contrast, research pertaining to more 
general linkages between trade and labor markets, such as the potential impact of trade on 
employment, has lagged.
3  This is undoubtedly due to the belief among most economists that the 
“level of employment is a macroeconomic issue…depending in the long run on the natural rate 
of unemployment, with microeconomic policies like tariffs having little net effect.”
4 
  While it may be possible to argue that the long-run impact of trade on employment is 
negligible, one can make a strong argument that the short-run effects can be substantial.  After 
all, trade liberalization causes some sectors to expand while others contract.  As long as factors 
of production are not able to adjust immediately, there are bound to be adjustment costs 
characterized by periods of unemployed resources.  As Baldwin, Mutti, and Richardson (1980) 
note, it is “bad economics” to ignore these potential costs since the near present (when costs are 
incurred) counts more heavily than the “long run” (when most benefits accrue) as long as 
economic agents discount the future. 
                                                 
1 See Frey, et. al. (1984). 
2 What may be more surprising is that more than a quarter of the French economists generally disagreed with this 
statement, as did roughly 13 percent of the Austrian economists, 10 percent of the Swiss economists, and 5 percent 
of the German economists. 
3 There is some evidence, however, that this issue is gaining broader interest in the profession.  For example, the 
Autumn 2000 issue of the Review of Oxford Economic Policy is devoted to the issue of globalization and labor 
market adjustment.   
4 See Krugman (1993).  
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  If the adjustment c osts due to globalization are important for the U.S. economy, which is 
relatively non-distorted and has been relatively open to trade and investment for many years, 
they are likely to be doubly important for many developing countries where resource allocation 
has been grossly distorted by heavy-handed government intervention as well as substantial trade 
barriers.  Presumably, the benefits of policy reform are larger for more distorted economies than 
for less distorted economies.
5  However, adjustment costs are also likely to be larger in the more 
distorted economies.
6  
The primary focus of this paper is on examining the adjustment costs that arise due to 
trade reform.  Do the gross benefits of reform outweigh the adjustment costs?  How does the net 
benefit of trade reform depend on the existence of other distortions in product and labor markets?  
One particular set of labor market distortions consist of labor-market policies aimed at softening 
the potential negative impacts on income distribution.  Since overall social welfare certainly 
depends in some way on the distribution of income, such policies may be desirable even if they 
tend to increase the magnitude of adjustment costs.   
In the next section, I define what I mean by the adjustment costs of trade reform.  I then 
turn in section 3 to a brief survey of the empirical literature that has attempted to measure these 
costs.  I sketch out a simple general equilibrium model with dynamic adjustment to trade reform 
in section 4.  I then turn to a number of unresolved issues and offer some suggestions for future 
research in section 5.  Section 6 concludes the paper. 
I offer this model as a means of illustrating a potential methodology for quantifying 
adjustment costs.  I leave out a great deal of (country-specific) institutional detail.  As such, 
numeric results generated by this model ought not to be taken too seriously.  With that caveat in 
mind, I offer some simulation results in the appendix. 
                                                 
5 By policy reform, I am referring to a wide range of reforms that also include the liberalization of international trade 
and investment.  Examples of such reforms include the privatization of state-owned enterprises, eliminating legal 
impediments to interregional migration, allowing for the establishment of well-functioning capital markets, and so 
on. 
6 We know from the theory of the second best that this need not be true.  To the extent that distortions have 
offsetting effects on resource allocation, the actual distribution of resources in the presence of distortions could be 
relatively close to the optimal allocation of resources when there are no distortions.  While this is a theoretical 
possibility, it is my sense that most economists would agree that the allocation of resources in, say, China would be 
quite different if all distortions were eliminated.  
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2.  Defining Adjustment Costs. 
Trade reform, like many types of shocks or policy changes, likely results in changes in 
relative prices and therefore a reallocation of resources across productive activities.  This 
reallocation may be associated with a wide array of costs, real and psychic, private and societal.  
For example, some workers toward the end of their work life may find that the best they can do 
is continue to work in their present job even though their real wage erodes.  This loss of real 
income is a private cost borne by the worker, but it need not be a cost to society as long as the 
worker continues to be paid according to his or her marginal product and as long as his or her 
marginal product is not higher in some other activity.  On the other hand, some workers may 
switch jobs, but experience a period of intervening unemployment.  The period of unemployment 
obviously poses a real cost to the individual worker, but it also imposes a real social cost to the 
extent that the economy is deprived of the output that the worker could produce if employed.  
Psychic costs may include the loss of self-esteem if a worker is involuntarily separated from his 
or her job, family disruptions that may result from financial pressures, and the loss of long-term 
on-the-job friendships when one relocates.  For purposes of this paper, I am only going to focus 
on the real societal costs generated by trade reform. 
The basic idea can be illustrated with the familiar production possibilities diagram.
7  In 
Figure 1,  XM represents the import-competing good, and  XE represents the export good.  The 
price lines represent world prices and I have implicitly assumed that this is a small country.  For 
simplicity, I have not shown domestic price lines.  Initially, trade is distorted, causing production 
to occur at point P0 and consumption to occur at C0.  After reform, domestic prices converge to 
world prices and production ultimately occurs at PT and consumption at CT, where subscripts are 
used to indicate time period.  However, even if full employment is maintained throughout, it is 
likely that movement from ( P0, C 0) to  ( PT, C T) will not be instantaneous.  Rather, it is more 
likely that the production point will slide gradually along the production possibilities curve, 
moving through points such as Pt.  If we measure social welfare by the value of income at world 
prices, then adjustment costs can be measured by the present discounted value of the difference 
between steady state income at the free trade equilibrium and income at production point Pt for 
every time period  T t K 0 = .
8  By contrast, the gross benefits of trade reform are measured by the 
present discounted value of the difference between steady state income at the free trade 
equilibrium and income at production point  P0.
9  The net benefit of reform is then the difference 
between t he gross benefits and the adjustment costs.  If there are no unemployed resources, so 
that the production point always lies on the production possibilities frontier as in Figure 1, the 
net benefits of trade reform are always non-negative.  However, the magnitude of the net benefit 
is an open question.  A lengthy period of adjustment could result in erosion of virtually all of the 
gross benefits, leaving only a small net benefit in the end.  In this case, the potential for a tiny net 
benefit may not be worth pursuing reform if such reform also results in undesired side effects, 
such as a deterioration in the distribution of income. 
                                                 
7 The analysis here is very similar to that presented by Baldwin, Mutti, and Richardson (1980) and Neary (1982). 
8 This is an overstatement of welfare in the initial tariff-distorted equilibrium because of the existence of the 
consumption distortion. 
9 Again, this is an underestimate of the gross benefit since trade reform removes both the production distortion and 
the consumption distortion.  
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What if resources are released from the shrinking import-competing sector faster than 
they are absorbed by the expanding export sector?  An extreme version of this case is illustrated 
in Figure 2.  Here, the real value of income at period t is actually  lower than the real value of 
income prior to reform.   
Figure 3.a shows the path taken by real income in the case illustrated by Figure 1, 
whereas Figure 3.b shows the path taken by real income given the circumstances underlying 
Figure 2.  The method of measuring adjustment costs in this case is identical to the full-
employment case.  In terms of Figures 3.a and 3.b, the adjustment costs are measured by the 
(appropriately discounted) area between the horizontal dashed line at YT and the solid line (which 
represents real income at each period after reform).   The gross benefit of reform is the same in 
Figures 3.a and 3.b.  This is captured by the (appropriately discounted) area between the 
horizontal dashed lines at Y0 and YT .  Figure 3.b makes it plain that the existence of unemployed 
resources may cause the magnitude of the adjustment costs to exceed the magnitude of the gross 
benefits of reform.  This follows from the fact that adjustment costs in the periods immediately 
after reform are actually larger than the gross benefits of trade.  With a high enough discount 
rate, this negative net benefit early in the process may outweigh any p ositive net benefit that 
emerges later. 
At a superficial level, the adjustment cost described in the preceding paragraphs is most 
appropriately associated with advanced market economies where open unemployment is non-
trivial and where there exits reasonably strong social safety nets.  By contrast, open 
unemployment is relatively rare in developing countries.
10  In these economies it may be more 
appropriate to speak of “underemployment.”  However, the concept of adjustment cost outlined 
here are still applicable.  In this case, a worker who finds himself or herself retrenched from a job 
with high private and social returns may experience a spell of underemployment (requiring 
significantly less human capital than he or she possesses) before ultimately returning to a job in 
which he or she would be considered fully employed.  In this case, official employment statistics 
would continue to show full employment along the transition path yet the value of national 
output would fall before eventually attaining a higher level. 
3.  Previous Empirical Implementation. 
While there exists a fair amount of anecdotal evidence suggesting that the adjustment 
costs of trade reform are relatively small, surprisingly few studies attempt to actually quantify 
these costs in a systematic way.
11  Moreover, the small handful of more rigorous studies that do 
exist pertain primarily to the United States or other industrialized economies.  In this section, I 
first describe the findings of the more rigorous attempts at capturing adjustment costs.  I then 
turn to some anecdotal evidence regarding adjustment costs in developing countries. 
A.  Relatively Formal Studies of Adjustment Costs. 
The first attempt at treating this issue formally was undertaken by Magee (1972).  In his 
paper, Magee divided  traded goods into a number of broad categories and then asked what the 
                                                 
10 For example, the 1993 unemployment rate in India was under 2 percent. 
11 See Matusz and Tarr (2000) for a fairly comprehensive review of both the anecdotal and more formal evidence 
regarding the size of these costs.  
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gross welfare gain would be if the United States unilaterally eliminated all trade restrictions.  The 
welfare calculations followed the standard “textbook” treatment of the elimination  of deadweight 
loss, being careful however to understand that the benefits would proceed into the infinite future.  
To estimate adjustment costs, he first estimated the number of workers that would have to be 
shuffled between sectors, then he assumed that 2 0 percent of these workers would move each 
year until adjustment was complete.  Furthermore, he assumed that the workers who would be 
forced to move would have to spend some time unemployed.
12  He then multiplied the amount of 
time unemployed by the average wage within a sector to obtain lost wages.  This number was 
calculated for the first five years after trade reform, then discounted back to the start of reform.  
By his estimates, the gross welfare benefits of trade reform in the first year alone were larger 
than the present discounted value of all adjustment costs, even when the future was lightly 
discounted.
13  In other words, his estimates for the United States were consistent with something 
like Figure 3.a rather than Figure 3.b. 
Baldwin, Mutti, and Richardson (1980) took a more sophisticated approach to the 
problem.  First, they constructed a highly disaggregated model of the U.S. economy based on an 
input-output analysis.  Having constructed the model, they calculated the amount by which each 
of 327 sectors would expand or contract if there was a 50 percent multilateral tariff reduction.  
Like Magee, they assumed that workers exiting contracting sectors would have to spend some 
time unemployed before finding new employment.  As such, expanding sectors w ere assumed to 
draw new employees from the pool of unemployed.
14  In their model, contraction and expansion 
occurs immediately upon liberalization.  The number of unemployed may either increase or 
decrease, depending on the net effect.  Moreover, the  mix of unemployed may change.  In 
particular, they undertook statistical analysis to calculate the average duration of unemployment 
for a worker based on that worker’s demographic characteristics (age, sex, race, and education).  
They then used the demographic m akeup of each sector to calculate the number of days of 
unemployment added to the pool (in the case of a contracting sector) or subtracted from the pool 
(in the case of an expanding sector).  The net effect was then multiplied by the sector-specific 
wage t o calculate lost wages due to adjustment.  Using this procedure, they found that 
adjustment was almost always a relatively short process, taking less than one year to complete 
and the associated costs were again trivial compared with the present discounted value of the 
stream of benefits. 
The primary weakness shared by both of these studies is that the conceptual framework 
underlying the empirical implementation is, from a formal point of view, static whereas the 
question of adjustment is inherently dynamic.  In both cases, there is an ad hoc assumption that a 
certain number of workers are dropped into the pool of unemployed, spends a fixed amount of 
time there, and then exits.  But we know that the process of job turnover is more complicated 
than that.  In  any economy, jobs are continuously being created and destroyed.  For some 
economies, we have some reasonable estimates of the rates at which these events occur.
15  
Furthermore, the “average duration of unemployment” does not adequately capture the 
                                                 
12 Depending on the particular sector, he assumed durations of unemployment ranging from roughly 8 weeks to 16 
weeks. 
13 He calculated his results assuming  discount rates of 4, 7, and 10 percent. 
14 They also allow for adjustments of the capital stock, but that is not my focus in this paper. 
15 For example, see Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996).  
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experience of any particular worker.  The average duration may be only 16 weeks, but some 
workers may be unemployed for much longer periods of time. 
One study that is closer in spirit to taking a truly dynamic approach to the problem was 
conducted by Takacs and Winters (1991).  In their study, the authors examine the consequences 
of removing protection from the British footwear industry.  They explicitly consider the natural 
rate of job turnover in this industry, which they find to be quite high.  The upshot of their 
analysis is that the downsizing of the industry in response to tariff removal could occur very 
quickly simply by the process of natural job loss.  While this analysis takes a more dynamic view 
of the labor market, it suffers from the fact that it is partial equilibrium in nature.  In a steady 
state, new employees are hired as existing employees are separated.  Shrinking the number of 
steady-state jobs means that workers who would have found jobs in this industry must now look 
elsewhere.  The analysis by Takacs and Winters does not account for this. 
In one of the few formal analyses of adjustment costs in a developing country, de Melo 
and Roland-Holst (1994) built a general-equilibrium model of the Uruguayan economy in which 
they incorporated rigidities in  the labor market as well as protection from international trade.  
They chose to focus on administered protection, which generates strong incentives for rent-
seeking activity and therefore is generally associated with larger efficiency losses than 
comparably restrictive tariffs.  After building and calibrating their model, the authors estimate 
that removal of all trade protection would likely entail the eventual relocation of five percent of 
the labor force and (in one scenario), the ultimate welfare gain would be valued at approximately 
eight percent of GDP.  However, it is not easy to interpret these results.  Since the authors do not 
have a truly dynamic model, they have provided no estimate of the time that it would take for the 
labor force to reallocate across activities.  In other words, it is not possible to figure out how long 
it would take before the new steady state is reached.  Furthermore, the authors do not furnish any 
information regarding the normal rate of labor turnover, making it difficult to judge the difficulty 
with which five percent of the labor force can be moved between sectors. 
B.  Less Formal Studies of Adjustment Costs. 
  During the past three decades, numerous countries in South America, Asia, Africa, and 
Eastern Europe have undertaken significant liberalization of their trade policies. As a group, 
these countries can be characterized as relatively labor abundant.  According to the Heckscher-
Ohlin model of trade, we would expect trade liberalization to increase labor demand, and 
therefore wages in these countries.  Modifying the Heckscher-Ohlin model to allow for changes 
in aggregate employment, the increased demand for labor might manifest itself as an increase in 
overall employment.  To my knowledge, there are no formal estimates of the impact of 
liberalization on aggregate labor demand in developing countries.  However, there are several 
studies that examine changes in employment before, during, and after periods of significant 
liberalization.
16  In almost all cases, employment is higher immediately after reforms when 
compared with employment levels prior to the implementation of such reforms.  The natural 
conclusion to reach is that adjustment costs are relatively insignificant even in the face of very 
large policy reforms.  While more  careful analysis may yield this result, several reasons suggest 
                                                 
16 See, for example, Papageorgiou, Choksi, and Michaely (1990), Parker, Riopelle, and Steel (1995), and Harrison 
and Revenga (1995).  These studies are reviewed in Matusz and Tarr (2000).  
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that it is probably best to interpret the overall employment trends with a grain of salt.  First, the 
employment figures usually only represent manufacturing employment.  Gains in manufacturing 
could, in principle, be offset by losses in non-manufacturing sectors.  Second, these figures do 
not account for the possibility that reforms generate a significant amount of underemployment 
even as overall measured employment increases.  Third, there is no well-specified 
counterfactual.  It may be that manufacturing employment would have grown even faster in the 
absence of reforms.  Alternatively, manufacturing employment might have stagnated, or even 
declined, had reforms not been adopted.  The bottom l ine is that, in the absence of a well-
specified model, these results fall well short of providing conclusive evidence. 
4.  A Model of Adjustment With A Dynamic Labor Market. 
My purpose in this section is to build a simple general equilibrium trade model that 
explicitly incorporates a dynamic labor market.  Doing so, I will then be able to explicitly solve 
for the dynamic adjustment path that is entailed in moving from one steady state (e.g., a tariff 
distorted steady-state) to another (e.g., a free trade steady state).  The development of the model 
illuminates the type of empirical information that would be necessary to estimate the adjustment 
cost of trade reform. 
Consider the labor market of a two-sector economy.  To fix ideas, call the two sectors the 
export sector (X) and the import-competing sector (M).  Assume that the labor market is dynamic 
in the sense that employed workers randomly become separated from jobs while unemployed 
workers randomly find jobs.
17  This process occurs continuously throughout time.  Further 
assume that transitions between employment and unemployment follow a Poisson process, where 
bi is the rate at which workers are separated from employment in sector i and where ai is the rate 
at which those looking for a job in sector i become employed.
18  Using a dot over a variable to 
denote the derivative of that variable with respect to time, the equations of motion governing the 
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where 
E
i L  represents the number of workers employed in sector  i, and 
U
i L  is the number of 
unemployed workers searching for employment in sector i.
19   
  Define  Li as the number of workers who  are either employed in sector  i or who are 




i i L L L & & & + =  and in a steady state, 
                                                 
17 Once again, one could substitute the term “underemployment” for “unemployment” without in any way affecting 
the flavor of the results.  The important aspect of the model is that workers spend time in different activities with 
alternative social (and private) values, and there is a well-specified process by which workers make the transition 
from one activity to another. 
18 At this point, I assume that these transition rates are parametrically given and are independent of time.  However, I 
will discuss below possible determinants of these rates. 
19 Bear in mind that the variables 
E
i L and 
U





i i L L L + = where a bar over a variable indicates that the variable equals its steady state value.  
For now, assume that the values of  i L  are known.  Then using (1) and (2) along with the adding 



















= 4 . 
  How are the steady-state values of  i L  determined?  In order to solve for this steady-state 
allocation of labor, I need to say something about how workers decide upon the sector in which 
to seek employment. 
  In a standard full-employment model and in the absence of distortions, equilibrium in the 
labor market is attained when  M X w w = .  In this case, the equilibrium condition is more 
complex.  To see this, consider a worker who is currently unemployed.  He or she has to decide 
upon a sector in which to seek employment.
20  In making that decision, the wage that would be 
paid once employment is secured is certainly an important consideration.  However, the 
likelihood of finding a job, and the expected duration of a job once found are both considerations 
as well.  Furthermore, if the economy is not currently in a steady state, the worker must evaluate 
future wage prospects.  Formally, the expected lifetime income for a worker searching in either 
sector can be found by solving the following two equations: 








i V V V b w rV & + - - = 5  








i V V V a rV & + - = 6  
were r is the discount rate, 
E
i V  is the expected lifetime income of a person employed in sector i, 
and 
U
i V  is the expected lifetime income of an unemployed worker searching for a job in sector i. 
In an equilibrium, the marginal searcher must be indifferent regarding choice of sector.  That is, 




X V V = . 
To interpret (5) and (6), we can think of a job as an asset, where 
E
i V  is the value of that 
asset.  The flow value of the asset (the discount rate multiplied by the stock value) is then the 
flow income provided by that asset ( wi) plus the expected appreciation of that asset (
E
i V & ), less 





i i V V b - ).  Similarly, the value of being unemployed is the flow income provided to the 
                                                 
20 This is not an irrevocable decision.  Indeed, a searcher can flip back and forth between sectors at any time.  
However, in a continuous time framework, a searcher can only “knock on one door” at a time.  
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unemployed (assumed to  be zero in this case) plus the expected appreciation of the asset (
U
i V & ) 





i i V V a - ). 
  Solving (5) and (6) for 
E
i V and 
U



































































The intuition underlying (7) and (8) is quite clear.  Expected lifetime income for employed or 
unemployed workers is increasing in the wage paid, increasing in the rate at which jobs are 
found, and decreasing in the rate at which separations occur.   
  At this point, it is necessary to make some assumptions regarding the production side of 
the economy in order to characterize 
E
i V &  and 
U
i V & .  In a steady state, both of these values are 
zero.  However, they may be non-zero during a period of transition between steady states.  
Lifetime incomes depend on wages and transition probabilities, all of which may reasonably 
assumed to be time dependent.  Unfortunately, allowing wages or transition probabilities to vary 
with time imparts a significant degree of complexity to the model.
21  In order to keep the model 
simple and to focus on the essential aspects of adjustment costs, I shall therefore continue t o 
assume that transition probabilities are parametrically given.  In addition, I assume that labor is 
the only input in the production process and that technology is characterized by constant returns 
to scale.  This last assumption implies that wages do not depend on the distribution of workers 
between sectors.  While sector-specific wages may differ from their pre-reform values, the 
change is discrete.  That is, wages move immediately to the new steady-state values upon 
liberalization even though the movement of labor between sectors takes time. 
  If I add to the above an assumption that all workers are alike, the model has the 
undesirable feature that specialization will result for any relative price other than the autarkic 
relative price.  To get around this problem, I assume that workers are indeed different, and the 
difference lies in individual-specific worker productivities in the export and import-competing 
sectors.  In particular, I assume that worker j can produce one unit of the import-competing good, 
or  qj units of the export good.  Without loss of generality, I choose the index  j such that qj is 
decreasing in  j.  That is, I assume that workers identified by a low index number have a 
comparative advantage over workers with a high index number when i t comes to producing the 
export good.  With this added assumption, equilibrium wages are easily seen to be  
( ) ( ) j X j X q p q w a = 9  
                                                 
21 I return to this issue in the final section of the paper.  
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( ) M M p w b = 9  
















where  qz is the productivity in the export sector of the marginal worker.  All workers indexed 
( ) z j , 0 e  would prefer when unemployed to search for jobs in the export sector, while all workers 
indexed  ( ] L j , 0 e  would prefer when  unemployed to search for jobs in the import-competing 
sector.
22  In a steady state,  M X L L z L - = = .  Therefore, steady-state employment and 
unemployment can be solved from (3), (4), and (10). 
  Suppose that trade is now liberalized, reducing the domestic price of the import-
competing good until that price is equated with the exogenous world price.  This causes an 
immediate fall in the wage in the import-competing sector, therefore inducing the marginal 
searcher to switch sectors.  In terms of (10), t he right-hand side becomes smaller.  To restore 
equality, the productivity of the marginal worker in the export sector must fall.  That is, the new 
steady-state value of z must fall.   
  There are two possible cases to consider.  First, assume that the price shock is insufficient 
to induce workers who are actually employed in the import-competing sector to actually quit and 
start searching for jobs in the export sector.  Let  z D represent the number of workers who 
ultimately move to the export sector.  Some fraction of these workers are unemployed at the 
moment of liberalization and therefore immediately begin searching for employment in the 
export sector rather than continue searching in the import-competing sector.  From (4), this 






.  The remaining fraction is employed at the moment of liberalization, 
however these workers eventually become separated.  Upon separation, these workers find it in 
their interest to switch their search to the export sector. 
  All  of the movement (and therefore all of the adjustment costs) occurs in the 
neighborhood of the marginal worker.  Those who begin in the export sector (either searching or 
employed) continue to be associated with that sector with no net change in output produced by 
this mass of workers.  Those who have sufficiently low productivity in the export sector begin in 
the import competing sector and stay in that sector even after liberalization.  To focus on those 
workers who switch, define 
E
M S  a s the number of workers who eventually switch to the export 
sector but who are temporarily employed in the import-competing sector.  Similarly, define 
E
X S  
as the number of workers who were employed or searching in the import-competing sector prior 
to trade reform but who are now employed in the export sector.  Finally, define 
U
X S as the number 
of workers who were employed or searching in the import-competing sector prior to trade reform 
but who are now searching for employment in the export sector.  Movement between sectors is 
                                                 
22 Assume that qj is monotonically decreasing in j so that the solution to (10) is unique.  
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X S S S z + + = D 13 . 
Equation (11) simply expresses the fact that employment among eventual switchers in the 
import-competing sector falls at a constant proportional rate.  Equation (12) describes how the 
number of switchers employed in the export sector varies with time.  The first term on the right-
hand side of this equation is the flow into employment from the pool of unemployed, while the 
second term is the flow out of employment into the pool of unemployed.  Finally, (13) simply 
accounts for all switchers.  Solving this system yields the following: 
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  The solutions themselves are not particularly informative.  What is important is to 
recognize that it is possible to derive an explicit, closed-form solution for the entire adjustment 
path.  Moreover, the determinants of that path are (in principle) empirically observable 
parameters.  Going one step further, the adjustment path for output can be completely determined 
if one assumes an explicit distribution of worker abilities.
23 
  In two recent papers, Carl  Davidson and I implemented a similar model in order to 
estimate the adjustment costs of an economy that removed a small import tariff.
24  We chose 
parameters for job turnover roughly consistent with U.S. experience.  In particular, we assumed 
that in the export sector (which we characterized as a high-tech sector) jobs had an average 
duration of 10 years, implying  10 1 = X b .  We assumed that jobs in the import-competing sector 
(which we characterized as a low-tech sector) had an average duration of 1 year, implying 
1 = M b .  We chose job acquisition rates and other parameters so that the steady-state 
unemployment rate was in the neighborhood of four percent.
25  In this context, we found that 
adjustment costs were substantial share of the gross benefits of trade liberalization.  In our base 
                                                 
23 Suppose, for example, that  M X a a = and  M X b b = .  Then total employment remains unchanged along the 
entire adjustment path.  However, the mix of output is only optimal at the new steady state.  This situation 
corresponds to Figure 3.a. 
24See Davidson and Matusz (2000a, 2000b). 
25 Our model was a bit more complex than the one presented in this paper.  The main departure from the present 
model is that we assumed that workers needed to train for a particular line of employment before searching for a job. 
However, the underlying concepts were all the same.   
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case, the net benefits of trade liberalization were less than 15 percent of the gross benefits with 
adjustment costs eating up a bit more than 85 percent of the benefits.
26 
 
5.  Open Questions. 
The model presented above provides a starting point for thinking about adjustment costs 
in the context of a rigorous general-equilibrium framework.  Indeed, armed with a few simple 
parameter estimates it is possible to use this simple model to generate some r ough estimates of 
adjustment costs.  However, a number of issues need to be addressed before more refined 
estimates of adjustment costs can be obtained. 
Perhaps the most important question to ask is how the transition probabilities are 
themselves determined.  For purposes of simplification, I treated them as parametrically given, 
analogous to the parameters of a production function.  More realistically, these variables are 
endogenously determined within the confines of the search technology by the interaction of cost-
minimizing and utility-maximizing behavior by firms and consumers.  Allowing for this 
possibility opens up an entire set of new issues.  For example, how are the equilibrium values of 
these parameters affected by labor-market policies such as laws governing circumstances under 
which firms may lay off or fire workers, experience-rated unemployment insurance, or 
government-sponsored programs to train workers and assist in job search?
27  Are the equilibrium 
values of the transition probabilities efficient?  If they are and if government policies affect these 
values, then the policies themselves are distortionary.  On the other hand there may be scope for 
government intervention if some market failure exists so that the endogenously determined 
transition probabilities are inefficient.  Government intervention that impacts the transition 
probabilities may be desirable based on equity considerations even if the intervention distorts the 
transition probabilities. 
In a related issue, it is likely that the t ransition probabilities depend on the degree of 
openness of the economy.  For example, removing trade protection exposes the economy to 
greater competitive pressure, perhaps causing turnover rates to increase.
28  In a recent series of 
                                                 
26 It is important to note that there are no distortions in this model and so equilibrium is dynamically efficient.  All 
losses are solely due to adjustment costs. 
27 Many economists cite institutional differences between the United States and the countries of Western Europe as 
the underlying reason that unemployment rates in the two regions are so dramatically different.  Siebert (1997) 
provides an overview of the more important institutional features of European labor markets.  Empirical work by 
Nickell (1997) correlates European unemployment rates with a host of labor market characteristics.  He finds 
significant correlations between unemployment and the degree of unionization, the level of unemployment 
compensation, and a number of other variables.  While the unemployment rate (and not turnover) is dependent 
variable in his regressions, it is clear that the equilibrium unemployment rate is determined in part by equilibrium 
job turnover.  In another paper, Meyer (1995) surveys the results of a variety of experiments in Illinois, Washington, 
New Jersey, and Pennsylvania designed to reduce the duration of unemployment.  In the context of the model above, 
the duration of unemployment would be the inverse of ai, the rate at which workers exit the pool of unemployment.  
As reported by Meyer, certain forms of incentives can reduce the expected duration of unemployment (that is, result 
in higher values of ai). 
28 Furthermore, large policy changes such as trade liberalization may generate congestion due to the large numbers 
of workers who find it advantageous to switch sectors or to re-train.  Any bottlenecks emerging in this situation 
would add to the costs of adjustment.  
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papers, Bhagwati has s uggested the possibility that increasing globalization has led to greater 
turnover due to a phenomenon that he calls “kaleidoscopic comparative advantage.”
29  The idea 
here is that technological information travels so fast and global markets are so competitive that 
profit margins are razor thin.  Very small changes in production costs can push existing firms out 
of the market or allow new firms to break into the market.  To date, there is no solid evidence 
confirming this hypothesis.
30  However, I know of no  work that explicitly tries to examine the 
potential relationship between turnover and the degree of an economy’s openness.  Of course, an 
additional layer of complexity is presented if the transition rates are themselves time-dependent. 
It would appear that the model presented above provides a fairly explicit relationship 
between transition rates and adjustment costs.  At one level of analysis, this relationship is quite 
explicit.  Suppose, however, that there are two economies where the only difference between 
them is that labor markets are uniformly more dynamic in one economy compared with the other.  
That is, assume that the  i a and  i b terms in the more dynamic economy are proportionately higher 
than the corresponding terms in the other economy.  Which economy would have greater 
adjustment costs due to liberalization?  The answer would seem obvious.  The economy with the 
less dynamic labor market would take a longer time to adjust to the new equilibrium and 
therefore have higher adjustment costs.  However, there are subtle effects present that might 
actually imply that the more dynamic economy is beset by higher adjustment costs.  The intuition 
can be explained by reference to (10).  Differentiate (10) with respect to transition rates.  Let 
0 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ > = = = M M X X b a b a , where the circumflex indicates the percentage change in the variable.  
It is straightforward to show that equality in (10) is maintained if and only if  
( )





If (16) is not true, then the equality in (10) is disturbed, causing the expected lifetime income in 
one sector to exceed that in the other for the (initially) marginal worker.  Suppose, for example, 
that the left-hand side of (10) increases.  Then the worker who is initially indifferent between 
sectors strictly prefers to search for employment in the export sector if turnover rates increase 
proportionately.  In the new steady state, more workers are affiliated with the export sector.  
Therefore, the economy with the more dynamic labor market devotes a larger share of its 
workforce to the export sector, while the economy with the less dynamic labor force devotes a 
larger share of its workforce to the import-competing sector.
31  Now consider a small change in 
price due to import liberalization.  The right-hand side of (10) falls by the same percentage in 
both economies.  But restoration of equality might entail movement of different numbers of 
workers in the two economies.  This follows from the fact that the two economies start from 
different initial conditions.  I illustrate this point in Figure 4 where I have graphed the 
                                                 
29 For example, see Bhagwati and Dehejia (1994) and Bhagwati (1998). 
30 At least some evidence suggests otherwise.  Greenaway, Upward, and Wright (2000) find evidence that turnover 
in the U.K. was higher between 1970 and 1990 than it has been since 1990. 
31 Note that I am not assuming that these two economies are trading with each other.  Rather, I am comparing two 
different economies facing identical circumstances in order to imagine how each might respond to trade 
liberalization.  
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comparative productivity of workers in the export sector as a function of the index number j.
32  
As drawn, a small reduction in  q needed to restore equality in (10) is associated with a very large 
number of workers who would shift between sectors.  The reason is that many workers are very 
similar in terms of their productivity in the export sector along this range of the productivity 
distribution.  By contrast, an economy  operating along a steeper part of this curve would have to 
shift relatively few workers before equality is restored in (10).  That is, (if the distribution of 
comparative advantage is that portrayed in Figure 4), the economy that begins with many 
workers i n the export sector will end up shifting many more workers to this sector if trade is 
liberalized compared with the shift that would occur in the other economy.   
  Putting the pieces together, the more dynamic economy starts with more workers in the 
export sector compared with the less dynamic economy.  Given the implicit assumptions 
underlying Figure 4, this means that upon liberalization, more workers will ultimately shift 
sectors in the more dynamic economy compared with the less dynamic economy.  There are then 
two opposing forces at work when trying to compare adjustment costs.  On the one hand, 
workers in the more dynamic economy move more quickly through labor markets.  This effect 
alone tends to reduce adjustment costs compared with the less dynamic economy.  On the other 
hand, there are simply more workers to move through the system, thus tending to increase 
adjustment costs for the more dynamic economy.
33   
  The specifics of this example are dependent upon the particular assumptions of the 
model.
34  H owever, the more general lesson is that the magnitude of adjustment costs (and the 
gross benefits of trade reform) depends in an important and intricate way on the dynamism of the 
economy’s labor markets.  Further research is required to determine just how robust this result is 
and to determine its empirical relevance. 
  Finally, the model presented in this paper is free of distortions.  This may be a reasonable 
first approximation for getting at the adjustment costs associated with trade liberalization in 
advanced market economies, but not for developing countries that may be riddled with a variety 
of market distortions.  Further research is necessary to explore the behavior of labor market 




                                                 
32 Recall, I have assumed that worker j can produce qj units of output in the export sector, and I have chosen to 
number workers such that qj is decreasing in j. 
33 To say that more workers must move upon liberalization is equivalent to the statement that a given amount of 
price distortion leads to a larger distortion of resources in the more dynamic economy than in the less dynamic 
economy. 
34 Davidson and Matusz (2000b) develop a model where adjustment costs are at their smallest for an intermediate 
range of transition rates, being the largest for the least dynamic and most dynamic economies 
35 Congestion externalities are a particularly interesting distortion to consider.   Karp and Paul (1994) derive the 
optimal path of liberalization in an economy where marginal adjustment costs are increasing in the number of 
workers who switch sectors.  They argue that under specified circumstances, the optimal p ath is immediate 
liberalization followed by a gradual phasing in of tariff protection, and then a gradual phasing out of that protection.   
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6.  Conclusion. 
  There is no question that trade reform has significant implications for income 
distribution.  All arguments supporting trade reform emphasize issues of efficiency.  That is, 
absent terms-of-trade effects, the size of the economic pie is maximized when there are no trade 
distortions.  While this may be true in a steady state, there is a real issue regarding the overall 
effects along the transition between steady states.  If the associated adjustment costs are large 
enough to eradicate the lion’s share of efficiency gains, then concerns over an adverse impact on 
income distribution might make the status quo a preferred option.  Getting a sense of the overall 
adjustment costs, particularly as they relate to the gross benefits of trade reform, is then critically 
important.  Surprisingly, the number of formal studies directed at this topic is extremely small.  
Moreover, the methodologies that have been employed have been rather rudimentary. 
  After a brief review of some existing evidence on adjustment costs, my purpose in this 
paper was to show how one might go about merging rather standard elements of general 
equilibrium trade theory with a dynamic labor market.  The result is an explicit way to capture 
adjustment costs based on a small number of empirically observable parameters.  The model is 
fairly basic, and future research should focus on elaborating both the elements of the labor 
market (e.g., the determinants of the transition rates) and elements of the production side of the 
economy (e.g., incorporating multiple factors of production and allowing for wage dynamics in 
addition to employment dynamics).  
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  In order to simulate the model described in Section  3 of the text, I must first make some 
assumptions regarding the distribution of worker productivities in the export sector.  Toward that 
end, I shall assume that  
( ) j j q q A - = 1 .  
where  q is an exogenously-specified parameter, and where  j is distributed uniformly on the 
interval  [ ] q , 0 .  In the numeric results that follow, I set  2 = q  so that the average worker can 
produce one unit of the export good, which equals the quantity of the import-competing good 
producible by each worker. 
  I further simplify the model by assuming that  M X a a = and  M X b b = .  As pointed out in 
note 23, this simplification implies that the overall rate of unemployment is independent of the 
mix of workers between s ectors.  In particular, the unemployment rate remains constant 
throughout the entire transition path. 
  Finally, I assume that the economy under study is small and that the world prices of both 
the exportable and the import-competing good are equal to unity.  With an import tariff (T), the 
domestic price of the import-competing good is then ( ) T + 1 .   
  Define  ( ) T i l  as the share of the labor force (including both the employed and 
unemployed) associated with sector  i in the steady state equilibrium.  Combining (10) with the 
above assumptions, it is a simple matter to deduce 







1 2 . l  







3 . l . 
Furthermore, from (A.2) and (A.3), it is evident that complete trade liberalization ultimately 
results in t he fraction 
q
T
 of the workforce moving out of the import-competing sector and into 
the exportable sector. 
  Once again turning to (10), the worker who is just indifferent between sectors has a 
marginal productivity  T q Z + =1 .  This is the same result that would obtain in a full-employment 
model since turnover rates in the two sectors are assumed identical.  In this situation, workers 
only consider the wage rates in the two sectors, searching for employment in the sector with the 
higher wage.  
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  Given the assumed uniform distribution of productivity, the average product of labor in 









+ = W  
while the average product of labor in the import-competing sector is simply 1.  Finally, the 





A +  
  To calculate the value of output (measured at world prices) at time t, simply multiply the 
number of employed workers in each sector by the average product of labor of those workers.   
  In the numeric exercise that follows, I assume that the initial tariff rate is 10 percent and 
that the discount rate is 3 percent.  I choose ranges for the turnover parameters in order to 
explore the robustness of the results. 
  Table A.1 shows two pieces of information.  The entries contained in the first five rows 
of the table represent the simulated unemployment rates that emerge in the model based on the 
various combinations of job-acquisition  (a) and job-breakup ( b) rates.
36  In order to avoid the 
appearance of precision, I have rounded the results to the nearest whole number. 
  The entries in this table behave as predicted.  Unemployment rates vary directly with job 
acquisition rates and inversely with breakup rates. 
 
Table A.1 
  1 . = b   2 . = b   25 . = b   4 . = b  
1 = a   9  16  20  29 
2 = a   5  9  11  17 
3 = a   3  6  8  12 
4 = a   2  5  6  9 
6 = a   2  3  4  5 
ratio  23  13  11  7 
 
The last row in the table is labeled  ratio.  Entries in this row represent the ratio of adjustment 
costs to gross benefits.  In this context, the gross benefits of trade reform equal the present 
                                                 
36 As a reminder, these rates are not subscripted because they are assumed to be the same across sectors.  
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discounted value of the difference between the value of GDP subsequent to reform and the value 
of GDP prior to reform, where both values are computed using world prices.  The adjustment 
costs are the present discounted value of the difference between the value of GDP prior to reform 
and the actual value of GDP at each instant between from the moment of liberalization through 
the infinite future.   This ratio is almost completely insensitive to changes in job-acquisition rates 
but are highly sensitive  to breakup rates.
37  For example, when the job breakup rate is .10 
(corresponding to an average job tenure of 10 years), adjustment costs are 23 percent of gross 
benefits.  At the other extreme, when the breakup rate is .4 (corresponding to an average job 
tenure of 2.5 years), adjustment costs are only 7 percent of gross benefits.  Of course, the model 
presented here is for illustrative purposes only and these numbers should be taken with a heavy 
dose of salt. 
  Before concluding, I wish to turn to one final  simulation.  Data from India’s National 
Sample Survey Data for Urban Households indicates that more than 80 percent of unemployed 
individuals find employment within 6 months.  A back-of-the envelope calculation reveals that 
the average duration of unemployment is roughly 4.4 months, corresponding to a value of 
7 . 2 = a .  The data also show that the rate of open unemployment during the period 1993-94 was 
very low, hovering just under 2 percent.  Finally, the data indicate that breakup rates are 
extremely low.  Fewer than 4 percent of those surveyed indicated that they changed either the 
nature of their work or their establishment during the preceding two years.  This would 
correspond to a value of  02 . = b .  In other words, expected job duration is 50 years. 
  Using  7 . 2 = a  and  05 . = b , the calculated unemployment rate is 0.7 percent, which is not 
far from the reported value.  Furthermore, the ratio of adjustment costs to gross benefits is 
calculated to be 60 percent.  This is a very high number and results from the very slow 
adjustment process.  The slowness of the adjustment process is evident in Figure 5, where I have 
graphed the calculated path taken for GDP for 10 years after liberalization.
38  In this figure, the 
dashed line represents the post-reform steady-state level of GDP, while the solid line represents 
the period-by-period level of GDP subsequent to liberalization. 
                                                 
37 The reason that the ratio does not vary with breakup rates is that the number of workers who switch sectors and 
ultimately become employed in the exportable sector is proportional to 
bt e
- .  This is only true under the 
assumptions that  M X a a =  and  M X b b = . 
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